Plan for the worst, hope for the best? Exploring major events related terrorism and future challenges for UK event professionals by Baxter, Daniel et al.
Plan for the worst, hope for the best? Exploring major events related terrorism and
future challenges for UK event professionals
Baxter, Daniel; Flinn, Jenny; Picco, Lucrezia Flurina
Published in:







Link to publication in ResearchOnline
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Baxter, D, Flinn, J & Picco, LF 2018, 'Plan for the worst, hope for the best? Exploring major events related
terrorism and future challenges for UK event professionals', International Journal of Tourism Cities , vol. 4, no. 4,
pp. 513-526. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJTC-03-2018-0021
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please view our takedown policy at https://edshare.gcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5179 for details
of how to contact us.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2020
Plan for the Worst, Hope for the Best? Exploring major events related terrorism 




Purpose – This paper investigates major event related terrorism and the resulting 
challenges that event professionals may face when hosting major events in cities as 
part of a destination marketing strategy. 
Design/methodology/approach- The research was based in the UK due to the 
significant rise in terrorist activities that have taken place in its urban cities in recent 
years. The exploratory nature of this study utilised semi-structured interviews with 
UK event professionals, enabling a preliminary, in-depth investigation of the 
challenges that events professionals face as a result of major event related 
terrorism.  
Findings - The research findings identify three challenges faced by event 
professionals when organizing major events: knowledge and understanding in 
relation to major event related terrorism; the impact of major event related 
terrorism in terms of responsibility and accountability; and managing for major 
event related terrorism in budgetary terms.  
Research Limitations/Implications - The research is limited to the UK, other 
destinations will pose their own unique challenges when hosting and managing 
events. It is suggested that this research be evaluated against similar studies in other 
destinations. This is a preliminary study and each of the topics identified within the 
findings warrant further exploration in their own right.  
Originality/value - The paper offers an insight into the challenges faced by event 
professionals in the UK when delivering major events as part of a destination 
marketing strategy. With the increase in major event related terrorism in cities the 
findings of this research are of relevance not only to event professionals but anyone 
with a role in destination and tourism development. 
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In an increasingly homogenized world, cities, regions and nation states often seek to 
develop a portfolio of cultural assets as a means to create and enhance their 
destination image; positioning themselves in an ever competitive marketplace 
(Ritche and Crouch, 2003). Major events regularly form a central part of this 
portfolio, acting as a showcase for the destination. They act as drivers of tourism, 
bringing large numbers of people to the host city and provide a unique opportunity 
to market the destination to a potentially global audience through the media 
attention that they attract (Dredge & Whitford, 2011; Raj, Walters & Rashid, 2013). 
Event professionals therefore play an increasingly important role in contributing to 
the overall image of the city. However, while events bring numerous benefits, if they 
are not managed correctly they can also garner negative attention that will detract 
from the destination’s appeal (Kissoudi, 2010).  As has been witnessed in recent 
times, the nature of major events makes them susceptible to terrorist attacks, which 
can be detrimental to the destination image. Not only do events afford the 
opportunity to inflict major damage due to their size (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015) but the 
media coverage that they gain reaches a wide audience thereby fulfilling the aims of 
terrorist groups to create widespread fear and obtain international recognition 
(Lynn, 2012).  In order for cities to be able to leverage major events to drive tourism 
and enhance their brand image, it is evident that they must be able to deliver such 
events safely and securely. Thus, with the varying risks associated with hosting major 
events it is imperative that those empowered with their delivery manage, plan and 
prepare for all eventualities. 
Major events have historically been linked to terrorist activities with the attacks on 
the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games appearing 
to be the most noteworthy in the context of MERT research (Yarchi, Galily & Tamir,  
2015; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Since 9/11 Western societies have experienced an 
increase in terrorist activities (IEP, 2016) with major events considered as a sought 
after target (Spaaij, 2016). Much of the academic literature surrounding MERT has 
focused specifically on major sporting events (Carroll et al., 2014; Yarchi et al., 2015) 
including those mentioned above and more recently the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing and 2015 Paris attacks, which impacted upon the security measures and 
budget for the 2016 UEFA Championships (Shepard, 2016).  However, the recent rise 
in lone actor attacks indicates that cultural events are being increasingly targeted by 
terrorists, as can be seen in examples such as the 2016 Nice attack and 2017 
Manchester Arena bombing. This justifies the need to explore event professional’s 
perceptions of MERT and the implications for managing events safely and securely in 
western cities. The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate MERT and 
explore the resulting challenges that event professionals may face when delivering 
major events in cities. It offers an insight into the issues faced by event professionals 
when delivering major events as part of a destination marketing strategy, 
highlighting the potential challenges that may arise when hosting future major 
events. The research is based in the UK due to the significant rise in terrorist 
activities that have taken place there in recent years (IEP, 2016); thus, enabling a 
preliminary exploration of the challenges that events professionals face within cities. 
Understanding Terrorism 
Terrorism has been a topic of academic research for over 50 year yet no concise or 
widely accepted definition has been agreed upon (Schmid, 2004; Schmid, 2011; 
Giulianotti & Klauser, 2012; Dominguez, 2015, Tofangsaz, 2015; Sandler, 2016; 
Horgan, 2017). Any definition of terrorism will depend upon the observer’s 
perception, location and opinion as explained by Teichmann (1996:5) who states 
that, “the same kind of action will be described differently by different observers, 
depending on when and where it took place and whose side the observer is on”.  In 
defining terrorism for the purpose of this paper, no association is made with the 
generally positive connotation of a freedom fighter. Rather terrorism is found to 
utilize characteristics such as the unlawful use of violence; victimization of non-
combatants; motivation by religious, political, or ideological belief; and the desire to 
reach international attention (Taylor, 1988; Enders & Sandler, 2002; Schmid, 2004; 
Department of Defence, 2016; Sandler, 2016). Terrorism has various complex social, 
political and economic characteristics (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2012; Tofangsaz, 2016) 
and can also be identified in different forms (NaCTSO, 2009). Schmid (2004) provides 
an encompassing description of the key characteristics of terrorism that is applicable 
to a variety of contexts, irrespective of the country in which terrorism is occurring or 
the industry(s) it is affecting (see Table 1 below). 
 
Number Key Characteristic Element of Terrorism 
1 The demonstrative violence against human beings; 
2 The (conditional) threat of (more) violence; 
3 The deliberate production of terror/fear in target groups; 
4 The targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents; 
5 The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda; 
6 The fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of conflict waging; 
7 The importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences; 
8 The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; 
9 The predominately political character of the act; 
10 Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilise or immobilise sectors of the public  
Table 1- Defining Characteristics of Terrorism (Schmid, 2004) 
The characteristics outlined by Schmid (2004) assist in distinguishing terrorism from 
guerrilla or conventional warfare but much controversy exists with regards to the 
characteristics that are best suited to describe terrorism itself. The on-going 
academic and professional discourse shows the need to be explicit about exactly 
what is meant by the term for the purposes of this research. Therefore, a definition 
based upon the understandings of Schmid (2004), Sandler (2016) and the US 
Department of Defence (2016) is developed. Terrorism is identified as an act of 
violence against innocents that is based on ideological beliefs, has the goal to inflict 
maximum damage and/or create an atmosphere of fear; and is communicated to a 
large audience.  
Since 9/11, Western countries have become more aware of their vulnerability as 
targets for terror related activities with an Al Qaeda propagandist stating that 
inflicting damage and significant human losses at major events “is very easy, since 
there are numerous […] targets such as crowded sports arenas, annual social events, 
large international exhibitions [and] crowded buildings…” (Abu Mus’ab al Suri, 2012: 
249). This testimony demonstrates that major events are officially on the target list 
of terrorists. The Global Terrorism Index (2017) highlights the recent transnational 
tactics of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) combined with lone actor attacks 
as driving terrorism to its highest ever level.  The increased frequency of terrorist 
threats and attacks (particularly in the UK, France and the US) are impacting upon 
the public, various industry sectors and governments economically, socially and 
culturally (Baker, 2014; Berrebi & Klor, 2010; Marlett et al., 2003). Several member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
have reported a sharp rise in acts of terror over the last three years; culminating in a 
650% increase in deaths from terrorism between 2014 (77 deaths) and 2015 (577 
deaths), of which half resulted from attacks inspired or directed by ISIS (IEP, 2016). 
More recently a change in tactic has been observed, with attacks increasingly carried 
out by lone actors (e.g. Boston Marathon bombing, 2013) and popular methods 
including vehicle driven attacks (e.g. Berlin attack, 2016), home-built devices (e.g. 
Manchester Arena bombing, 2017) or the use of everyday objects (e.g. Nice attack, 
2016). These changes are considered to be of significance for city tourism 
practitioners and event professionals, as lone actors and homemade devices are 
considerably harder to detect than a large terrorist cell or sophisticated explosives.  
Major Event Related Terrorism 
As outlined previously, the 1972 Munich Olympics and 1996 Atlanta Olympics are 
regarded as the main MERT incidents prior to 9/11 (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; 
Giulianotti & Klauser, 2012; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015; Spaaij, 2016) with the Munich 
attack being considered to have had a significant impact on security arrangements 
for future events. As Spaaij (2016: 452) postulated, the incident was a “landmark in 
the intersection of terrorism and the Olympics”. While both attacks undoubtedly led 
to stricter security measures for Olympic Games, 9/11 is thought to be the key 
turning point that has accelerated and amplified the course of security requirements 
for major events more generally (Spaaij, 2016). Despite the growing relationship 
between major events and terrorism no academic consensus appears to have been 
reached regarding which major events to include in studies on MERT in a post 9/11 
context (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015; Yarchi et al., 2015; Spaaij, 2016). In order to 
demonstrate the evolution of MERT, a timeline of ten terrorist attacks which have 
either occurred at a major event or have had a direct impact on events in the period 
between the 1972 Munich massacre and the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing is 
presented in Table 2.  This highlights the variety of events that have been targeted 
and points to an increased frequency of attacks following 9/11 and particularly since 
2013. While this timeline does not attempt to include every incident that occurred 
within the chosen period it highlights those attacks that have had the most saliency 
in the media, with many of these events having occurred too recently to be 
mentioned in academic studies. While the majority of MERT research tends to be 
focused on major sporting events (Leopkey & Parent, 2009; Fourie & Santana-
Gallego, 2011; Carroll et al., 2014; Yarchi et al., 2015; Spaaij & Hamm, 2015; Spaaij, 
2016) the timeline demonstrates a clear shift in focus from sporting to cultural 
events.  This can be explained by the increasingly stringent security measures 
adopted by sporting events (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Sugden, 2012) and the 
shifting modus operandi of terrorists outlined above.  
 Table 2- Representative Timeline 
 
Table 2 Continued- Representative Timeline  
The various factors outlined in the examples above have led to a tightening of 
security measures at major events, especially in the initial aftermath of an attack 
(Heward, 2017; Reuters, 2017; Scally, 2017).  Several events in the UK adopted more 
stringent security as a result of recent attacks: Wimbledon 2017 was protected with 
a ring of steel (Sawyer, 2017), Glastonbury 2017 introduced extra bag searches and 
separate search lines (Express, 2017) and anti-terrorism barriers were installed at 
the Edinburgh International Festival in 2017 to prevent terrorists from driving 
vehicles into crowds (BBC, 2017). As a result of the threat of terrorism, the 
organising process for major events appears to have become much more complex 
and a professional approach towards risk management strategies and the 
implementation of security measures is required. While the risk of terrorism is just 
one amongst many to consider when planning and hosting an event (Leopkey & 
Parent, 2009; Piekarz, Jenkins & Mills, 2015), the consequences of a successfully 
carried out attack are severe. An event security plan must therefore include 
strategies to “deter such [acts of terrorism] or to at least minimise their impact” 
(NaCTSO, 2009: 5).   
 Ibrahim (2016) provides a useful study on the methods used by event professionals 
to manage the risk of terrorism with the risk management methods discussed being 
seen to reflect the security measures that are currently implemented at major 
events in the UK as is highlighted in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1- Methods for Managing Terrorism Risk (Ibrahim, 2016) 
The method of providing more employee training appears to have become more 
important in the UK: The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds specifically mentions the 
certification requirements for stewards at spectator events (DCMS, 2008, section 
4.8). Choosing to increase the number of security staff can also be observed at 
various events, for example security presence was increased at Glastonbury 2017 in 
response to the London and Manchester attacks (Express, 2017). Regionally, in the 
UK, the organisers of TRNSMT festival in Glasgow decided to add more security staff 
and also employ civilian clothed police officers who monitored the crowd and looked 
for suspicious behaviour (McCool, 2017). Undertaking destination research and 
working with local stakeholders, including all security partners allows access to 
expert knowledge and shared resources. No indication is given as to whether the 
graph refers to attendee screening prior to the event or screening at egress and 
ingress points. Screening of bags before entering an event venue has however 
become common practice and restrictions on bag sizes have frequently been 
imposed (The SSE Hydro, 2017; Wimbledon, 2017). While all of these methods 
intend to make events more secure, they have subsequently led to an increase in 
security costs with an analysis conducted by the Wall Street Journal in 2004 
highlighting the sharp rise in the security expenditures of the Summer Olympic 
Games post 9/11 (Sugden, 2012). Since this time, security costs have remained 
between $1billion and $2 billion (McBride, 2016). 
International sporting events such as the Olympic Games are expected to have 
sophisticated security measures in place and therefore require access to large 
security budgets (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2009). However, that this is not always the 
case with major events organised on a national scale that, despite their international 
recognition, will still be required to address security; but on a reduced budget. While 
there is limited data available, it can be suggested that increased measures of 
security will have a significant impact on the future budgets of major events such as 
Glastonbury, Wimbledon and the Edinburgh Festivals. This suggests that the 
organisational costs for such events might increase in the future, potentially 
impacting upon their long-term sustainability.  
MERT and the Urban City  
Events continue to be a key element used to develop and market destinations (Getz, 
2008). They have a complex ambassadorial role for nations and regions, and have 
considerable economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts (Yeoman 2004; 
Stokes, 2008). Event tourism within cities is an industry that is growing rapidly.  
Already established as a multi-million-pound industry event tourism engages 
planned events as a pull factor to attract tourists to the destination (Rajesh, 2014). 
Such initiatives encourage boosterism and provide the opportunity to develop the 
image of the city (Jones, 2001; Getz, 2005; 2013; Dansero & Puttilli, 2010). 
Moreover, it encourages media attention, combats seasonality and attracts 
significant numbers of people. However, this can also bring various challenges to the 
destination.  
It has been demonstrated that it is the very characteristics that make major events 
attractive to host destinations that also make them attractive to terrorists. They 
afford the opportunity to inflict maximum human losses and the presence of the 
media ensures that any attack is communicated to a large audience (Spaaij & Hamm, 
2015; Yarchi et al., 2015). As mainstream and social media reporting on major events 
continues to grow, so to a platform to communicate to a large audience is created, 
thereby increasing the attractiveness for a terrorist attack (Giulianotti & Klauser, 
2012).  It is therefore imperative that such events are delivered safely and securely 
in order to reflect a positive image that positions the city as both a dynamic and safe 
destination. Rather than hoping for the best, event professionals are challenged to 
plan for the worst and terrorism undoubtedly falls under the category of worst 
outcomes possible.  
The increase in terrorism incidents in the UK have impacted the events industry 
significantly (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2012; Spaaij & Hamm, 
2015; Spaij, 2016) with Silvers (2008) suggesting that event professionals require not 
only a large scope of knowledge, but also an awareness of the legal and ethical 
responsibilities commonly associated with events. As a result, event professionals 
will face new challenges when organising major events and by exploring their 
knowledge on MERT, this will act as a viable tool in creating synergies between event 
professionals and  city tourism practitioners when using major events to develop city 
tourism strategies.  
Research Methodology 
 
The study at hand seeks to address the development of MERT and investigate the 
resulting challenges that UK event professionals face when delivering major events. 
The exploratory nature of this study meant that an interpretivist paradigm was most 
appropriate with Black (2006, p319.) suggesting that such an approach allows “the 
complexity and meanings of situations” to be addressed. This is further supported by 
Shaw (1999:70) who argues that interpretivism lends the researcher the ability to 
“embrace the complex and dynamic quality of the social world and allows (him) to 
view a social research problem holistically, get close to participants, enter their 
realities and interpret their perceptions”. Shaw’s statement is considered to be of 
considerable relevance for this research as the subjective perceptions and opinions 
of UK event professionals are researched, interpreted and analysed. The 
observational nature of the research meant that an inductive approach was followed 
with Hyde (2000) defining this as a theory building approach that starts with 
observations and seeks to generalise the phenomenon that is being investigated. 
Rather than seeking to explicitly test one theory, the research aims to add to existing 
knowledge surrounding the challenges MERT presents to city destinations. 
 
As the focus of the research sought to gain personal insights of UK event 
professionals, a qualitative research approach was considered to be the most 
appropriate strategy. This permitted for the flexibility required of the subject area 
(Creswell, 2013) and allowed for primary data to be gathered in the natural 
environment of the UK event industry. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as 
the most appropriate method enabling an in-depth understanding of the 
interviewee’s views and opinions to be gained (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). To prevent 
subjectivisms and impairing the research, careful attention was paid to the 
verbalisation of probing questions. 
 
A staged sampling procedure was followed as outlined by Wilson (2014): firstly, the 
overall population was defined as event professionals who had been exposed to 
major events within the UK. Secondly, the sampling frame was selected from the 
researchers’ networks and contacts which extended to both academics and 
practitioners with knowledge of the subject area. A combination of purposive 
sampling (Bryman & Bell, 2015) and convenience sampling (Wilson, 2014) was 
utilised to identify potential participants for the research. The sample size was then 
decided with Hoinville and Jowell (1985) arguing that sample size is a matter of 
judgement rather than calculation. Using an interpretivist approach and researching 
the phenomenon of MERT allowed for a small sample size. As the research was not 
looking to generalise findings or represent the opinions of an entire population, a 
sample size of five to ten participants was deemed to be appropriate for allowing in-
depth knowledge to be gained and comparison of opinions to be made. Of the 12 
event professionals contacted to participate a sample of five was gained. As can be 
seen in Table 3 these professionals demonstrate a range of expertise within the 
event management profession, creating a viable sample for this initial exploratory 
study. While it is acknowledged that the findings are not representative of all event 
professionals in the UK it should be noted that this research does not seek to create 
new theories but rather explore the phenomenon of MERT and understand the 
opinions and perceptions of UK event professionals, thereby determining the future 
challenges posed when organising major events in cities. 
 
 
Code Current Profession Areas of Expertise 
P1 Academic Practitioner Tour Management, Artist Management and 
Representation, Crowd Safety Management, 
Event Management, Festival Marketing and 
Promotion 
P2 Resilience and Contingencies 
Manager 
(Public Sector) 
Testing, Exercise and Readiness, Contingency 
Planning, Crisis Management, Major Sporting 
Events, Risk Management 
P3 Event Company Director 
(Private Sector) 
Event Logistic, Event Delivery, Transport Planning 
and Management, Contingency Planning, Crowd 
Management 
P4 Project Manager  
(Public Sector) 
International Relations, Government Policy, 
External Engagement, Project Management, 
Communication, MICE Sector 
P5 Senior Event Management 
Researcher  
Crowd Management, Risk Management, Event 
Planning and Delivery, Event Tourism and Policy, 
Cultural Events, Mass Participation Sporting 
Events. 
Table 3- Participant Sample 
Interviews were conducted during July 2017 with the following research questions 
providing the underpinning for the interview schedule: 
 
1. What is the extent of knowledge of the UK event professionals in relation to 
terrorism and terrorism development? 
2. How do UK event professionals perceive the event industry to have been 
impacted by major event related terrorism? 
3. What are the resulting challenges faced by UK event professionals in 
delivering future major events? 
 
Despite the fact that this research adopted an inductive approach, an a priori 
(deductive) coding approach was adhered to when analysing the interview data. 
Using such an approach meant that emphasis was given to similarity of answers 
rather than the frequency of individual words when analysing the data. Three 
themes emerged which reflected the research questions posed: knowledge and 
understanding of event professionals in relation to MERT; the impact of MERT in 
terms of responsibility and accountability; and the future challenge of managing for 
MERT in budgetary terms. These themes are explored within the results section 
below. 
   
Results 
Knowledge and Understanding 
It was important to understand how event professionals defined and understood the 
concept of terrorism, as this would influence the way in which they managed for 
potential terror attacks. All of the participants identified at least one of the elements 
of terrorism discussed in the earlier literature review. They specifically highlighted 
the changing nature of terrorism and a shift from domestic terror attacks to those 
conducted on an international scale. As explained by Participant Two, “I think we 
have become far more aware of global terrorism as a whole world population. The 
levels of extremism have probably drifted from, in many respects, what would have 
been more considered domestic extremism probably 40-50 years ago to more global 
extremism”. It was evident that event professionals recognised terrorism as a global 
issue and they further acknowledged that its focus and purpose is evolving with 
Participant One suggesting: 
In the past, it was more about making a statement. And if you look back to a 
significant number of the previous forms of terrorism that we dealt with, 
particularly in the UK, it seems looking back that it was the statement that 
was the important issue. Whereas I would suggest now it’s the actual 
damage that can be done to individuals that seems to be the motivation… I 
think there was less of an intention to harm people than perhaps the modern 
forms of terrorism we are seeing now from radical Islamic terrorism and also 
to a lesser extent the extreme right wing terrorism that has been starting to 
surface in Western societies.  
 
This evolution appears to have placed the general public more at risk of attack as 
evidenced by the 650% increase in terror related deaths reported in OECD member 
countries between 2014 and 2016 (IEP, 2016). Several of the participants alluded to 
the increased frequency of attacks with Participant Three highlighting that attacks 
have “absolutely spiralled”.  With major events often being the subject of significant 
media coverage (Yarchi, et al. 2015) they remain a significant target for terrorists. 
This is of concern not just to event professionals but wider city tourism practitioners 
as any such attack on a major event would have negative implications not only for 
the event but also the destination image and tourism potential of the city more 
widely as explained by Kissoudi (2010) 
 
While all participants identified that there had been an increase in terrorist attacks 
and a shift from domestic, regionally contained terrorism towards acts of terror on a 
global scale general understandings of terrorism were varied and appeared to be 
very much dependent upon the individual’s own experiences and how they 
perceived media reporting of terrorism. This reflects Teichmann’s (1996) notion that 
definitions of terrorism will depend very much on the perception, location and 
opinion of the individual. It is important to consider that city tourism practitioners 
will also have their own understandings of terrorism, which may differ from those of 
event professionals. As such, this could lead to differences of opinion as to how best 
to plan and manage for MERT within urban destinations. This was recognised by the 
participants who recognised that security strategies would be dependent upon the 
specific event and host city.  
 
There was a consensus supporting the need to develop and implement coherent 
understandings of terrorism and its potential implications for managing major 
events. It was recognised that this would require event professionals to enhance 
their knowledge and understanding of this area, as it had not been embedded in 
their initial training and education. Despite there being an increase in training 
provision across the UK (DCMS, 2008) there was some disagreement amongst 
participants as to the quality and relevance of existing provision. Reflecting on their 
own experience of attending training Participant Three stated that it was a “load of 
shite. It can therefore be surmised that while there is a need for training as outlined 
in Ibrahim’s (2016) model, it is essential that when delivered it is relevant and of a 
high standard. Content must enable employees to provide efficient and effective 
security when hosting major events.  
 
It was evident that UK event professionals had an awareness of terror developments 
but this was somewhat varied, being shaped by their own prior knowledge and 
world-view. The sector in which they worked had clearly influenced their 
understandings of MERT and how it could best be planned and managed for. What is 
of interest here is how this view may differ from that of city tourism practitioner’s 
and other key stakeholders whose understandings will be based on their own 
experiences and sector; this raises questions surrounding responsibility and 
accountability in relation to MERT. 
 
Accountability and Responsibility 
 
There was a considerable difference of opinion when participants were questioned 
as to whether they felt that events were a legitimate target for terrorists. On the one 
hand it was acknowledged that major events could be viewed to be at considerable 
risk due to the large crowds that they attract and associated media coverage that 
they gain (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015; Yarchi et al., 2015). However, a number of 
arguments were also presented as to why events may no longer be such a legitimate 
target. Most specifically, the participants felt that the enhanced security now 
present at major events lessened the risk of them being targeted by terrorist 
activities. As Participant Five stated, “major events have that security ring around 
them. So although they seem like a good target, actually it would probably be much 
easier to just go and walk into a shopping centre”. This echoes the views of Boyle 
and Haggerty (2009) and Sugden (2012) who point out the increasingly stringent 
security measures now adopted at sporting events in particular. However, with the 
shift in the modus operandi and focus of terrorists (e.g. London attacks, 2017) it 
could be argued that events do remain at threat. As Participant Five purported, the 
emotional and shocking aspect of targeting an event ensures that they remain at 
risk.  
A number of practical steps have been adopted in major event settings to enhance 
safety and security, including increased security presence, bag searches, roadblocks 
and other infrastructure. It could be argued that some of the security measures put 
in place go beyond what is required but as Participant Five suggests, due to the 
proliferation of media coverage terrorist attacks receive, consumers are now far 
more aware of potential risks posed when attending events. This reflects the earlier 
points made regarding the global nature of terrorism. Hence, the perceived image of 
safety associated with the host city is important. Participant Five further explains 
that some of the steps taken by event professionals do not always actually make the 
event any safer but they give a feeling of safety to the consumer. While safety is not 
something that consumers should have to consider when attending events, it is now 
a reality. Discussing an increase in security personnel at major events, Participant 
One points out that event organisers face a difficulty in that “in many ways if nothing 
happens and security don’t really have anything to do, that’s a good result. But from 
the organiser’s perspective it might seem like an unnecessary expense”.  
It became apparent that the participants felt that the increased need for security 
measures is exploited by some with Participant Two stating that, “a lot of people 
have used the incidents that have taken place to charge a lot more money for 
security”. They further argue, “everybody was coining, everybody was trying to get in 
on the action”. It is therefore evident that while the security for major events within 
the UK has been heightened, this has come at a cost. As with any business when 
supply costs increase, questions will arise relating to the impact this will have on the 
consumer and the participants indicated that this could affect the sustainability of 
some events. Additionally, it also needs to be considered who should be absorbing 
such costs, the consumer, the organizer or the host city. Nevertheless, participants 
highlighted that event professionals are required to increase security measures to 
reduce terror attacks even if there is also a detrimental effect to the overall event 
experience. For example, Participant Three discussed the security measures put in 
place for a large concert which took place following the Manchester Arena bombing 
in 2017, stating that the additional search requirements, necessitated by the change 
in UK security level meant that attendees had to queue for considerable amounts of 
time, negatively affecting their experience of the event. 
While the likelihood of terror attacks occurring within major events has been 
minimized, it could be suggested that these risks are in fact being shifted to the 
perimeter of the event. As Participant Four suggests, “event managers are stuck in a 
bit of a predicament they need to enhance their security checks at venues before the 
audience gets in. But all this is actually doing is creating a much softer target outside 
of a venue”. This was exemplified in the case of the Manchester, 2017 bombing 
where a home-made device was detonated within the public foyer of the arena 
rather than within the event itself. This attack led to venues and events across the 
UK enhancing security checks on entry (e.g. SSE Hydro, 2017; Wimbledon, 2017) but 
in turn, this led to considerable queues forming outside venues (as mentioned 
above) which present a risk in their own right. As Participant Two points out, “what 
we have done is push the incident from the locus”.  With terrorists now targeting the 
softer perimeter and outer areas of event, this raises serious questions regarding the 
point at which responsibility for crowd safety begins and ends. While event 
professionals are accountable for the event and its perimeter they are not 
responsible for wider security within the city. It is therefore vital that city tourism 
practitioners and other key stakeholders work alongside event professionals to not 
only ensure that the event itself is safe but that event attendees and tourists are 
safe throughout the city as ultimately any attack will reflect badly not only on the 
event but the destination image. As such, a co-ordinated approach to managing 
safety and security for future major events is advocated. 
This notion of collaboration at the destination level was highlighted by participants 
who suggested that event professionals should prioritise stronger links and 
communication with key stakeholders within the city such as police and emergency 
services. Participant Two supported this by establishing that greater communication 
links would “allow [access to] local emergency services knowledge and multi-agency 
knowledge”.  An understanding of the local environment and the ways in which 
relevant agencies operate will be vital to the successful delivery of major events and 
may lead to the sharing of best practice across events and destinations. This can be 
seen to reflect Ibrahim’s (2016) suggestion that more destination research and 
communication will enhance security. This is particularly important in the planning 
of international events, as while this research has focused on the UK perspective, it 
is evident that different countries and even different areas within countries will 
potentially present their own risks and security challenges.  
 
Balancing the Budget 
A growing need to balance tight security budgets with the requirement of making 
major events as secure as possible was discussed, with Participant Five highlighting, 
“it is essential to evolve with the industry and that costs money”. Numerous steps 
have been taken in relation to managing and planning for MERT with an increasingly 
professionalised approach to security and risk management being adopted at events 
across the UK. Security measures such as hiring more personnel, imposed searches, 
communication with law enforcement partners and further training have made 
events in the UK more secure but this has come at a price, with a significant increase 
in security budgets and hence the costs of such events. Each of the professionals 
identified that with the pressure to increase security the challenge was cost with 
Participant Two stating that “adding additional security staff is a good idea but its 
costly”. Although there was a consensus around increased budgets when hosting 
major events in cities, there was still scepticism with regards to the need for some of 
the measures being adopted with Participant Two suggesting that event 
professionals were being “fleeced” due to the increased pressured placed on them 
to ensure event attendees safety. Additionally, Participant Four postulated that 
“private security firms cost money and they will only do what they are paid to do”. 
There was little doubt that event professionals recognise the need to increase 
security measures with Participant One highlighting that “with the diversity of 
audiences attending events, so new strategies and security services need to be 
offered and to do this more training and resources are needed which costs money”. 
However, questions were raised as to the value of some of the enhanced measures 
that event professionals are expected to implement and whether these do in fact 
deter MERT. This could be seen to reflect the challenge noted above regarding 
differences in understandings relating to terrorism, how it can be defined, managed 
and planned for. 
It is evident that budgeting and increased costs are a significant challenge for major 
events and their organisers with a key consideration with regards to managing and 
planning for MERT relating to who should be responsible for absorbing these 
increased costs.  This was particularly highlighted by Participant Two who, when 
discussing the increased cost of policing events, suggested that the public sector 
“were failing the event organiser”. While both event professionals and city tourism 
practitioners acknowledge the need for increased security measures and to manage 
for MERT the predicament of who should be absorbing these costs is a considerable 
challenge. Furthermore, as was noted previously debate exists as to where 
responsibility for securing events and the wider city begins and end. 
Concluding Remarks 
The exploratory nature of this study means that it is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions from the findings or generalise these to a wider population; this was 
beyond the remit of the research. However, the research has highlighted a number 
of key challenges facing event professionals and city tourism practitioners with 
regards to the hosting of major events that warrant further exploration. The UK 
event professionals who participated in this research were found to be very 
knowledgeable with regards to terrorism and its developments. This can be 
attributed to the fact that their field of employment has been – directly and/or 
indirectly – impacted by terrorism. While all participants were knowledgeable about 
terrorism and its implications the varied definitions and understandings reflected the 
on-going academic discourse of how terrorism itself should be defined.  
Furthermore, it was noted that with definitions and understandings of terrorism 
being influenced by sector and world-view it is likely that city tourism practitioner’s 
understandings of terrorism and MERT more specifically might differ from those of 
event professionals. This could lead to potential conflict between key stakeholders 
as to how MERT may best be planned for and managed. As such, it is suggested that 
further exploration as to how key stakeholders within major events view and 
understand terrorism and more specifically MERT is required. 
Despite differing opinions, all participants agreed that the UK event industry has 
been considerably impacted by the increased number of attacks/threats and the 
changing methods of attack. These shifts are identified as having significantly 
impacted security measures at major events across the UK. Event professionals are 
increasingly expected to possess knowledge and skills to manage the risk of 
terrorism. This has professionalised approaches to security and risk management at 
events with more stringent security measures being employed. It was recognised by 
the event professionals that further education and training was required in relation 
to this with concerns being raised by some participants as to the quality and 
relevance of current provision. As such, it is suggested that further research is 
required to assess the current levels and content of training provision for event 
personnel in order to identify potential gaps in provision as well as cases of best 
practice. 
It was noted that while events continue to be a legitimate target for terrorists the 
enhanced security measures put in place to manage for MERT could be seen to make 
them less attractive. However, it was subsequently recognised that these enhanced 
measures can create softer targets at the event perimeter and outside of its 
boundary. Therefore, a key challenge for event professionals will be how they can 
secure the event venue/location without simultaneously creating a soft target 
outside of this secured perimeter. Furthermore, significant questions are raised as to 
where responsibility and accountability for event audiences begins and ends. This is 
a challenge for both event organisers and city tourism practitioners who would both 
be adversely affected by any attack either within or outwith the event. This further 
highlights that in order to best prepare for hosting a major event, collaboration and 
partnership working is required in order to share knowledge and expertise. With 
many cities and events managing this in different ways further exploration as to how 
this can best be managed is required. 
The higher cost of security measures was pointed out by all participants with the 
need to balance tight security budgets with the requirements of making major 
events as secure as possible being viewed as a significant future challenge for major 
events. While other security considerations may also impact the budget, it can be 
argued that an increase in terrorism will make the balancing act of securing an event 
whilst working within the boundaries of a restricted security budget even more 
challenging in the future. Furthermore, questions may be raised as to who is 
responsible for absorbing the cost of additional security measures – the host city or 
event organisers. With city tourism practitioners and event professionals having 
responsibility for delivering a successful event and both academic literature and 
destination development strategies continuing to identify the use of events in 
enhancing a city’s image, the challenge pertaining to who pays will remain prolific. 
Where in the past it could be argued that the benefits of hosting major events 
outweighed the costs, public perceptions are changing and as costs increase citizens 
are frequently calling into question whether these investments offer value for 
money. This further highlights the need to move beyond the exploratory scope of 
this initial research into a greater empirical study.  
Each of these areas requires further research in its own right with it being 
acknowledged that this research has been limited to the UK. Other destinations will 
pose their own unique challenges when hosting and managing events. What is clear 
is that despite enhanced security measures, major events will continue to be 
impacted by terrorism. It is left open for discussion if planning for the worst and 
hoping for the best will be the correct strategy. What has become clear from this 
research is that unpredictability is the new norm and that event professionals and 
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